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Abstract 
Learning predictive relationships between cues and outcomes is a central aspect of 
many cognitive tasks. Studies on judgment and decision making have provided knowledge of 
how experienced decision makers approach complex decision problems. It seems to involve at 
least two types of skill: (1) recognition skills based on subject matter expertise (i.e., acquired 
cognitive schemas), that is, knowledge of relevant cues, their mutual interrelationships and the 
relationships with  the criterion value that needs to be predicted, and (2) higher order critical 
thinking skills that serve to increase understanding by means of generalization and 
abstraction. Targeting training at these skills may improve cognitive flexibility through 
elaboration of the content (e.g., by generalisation, discrimination, or abstracting away from 
it). We established that  instructional methods for implementing critical thinking and 
contextual interference, separately and in combination, can increase transfer of judgment 
skills to new tasks and contexts.  
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Critical Thinking Instruction and Contextual Interference to Increase Cognitive 
Flexibility in Complex Judgment Tasks 
Research into judgment and decision making has shown that through experience 
people acquire knowledge that is structured in memory to facilitate instant retrieval of a 
solution when a situation is recognized as familiar (Chase & Simon, 1973; Klein, Moon, & 
Hoffman, 2006). However, in complex, ill structured task environments, simple analogies and 
prototypes do not suffice (Spiro & Jengh, 1997). According to Spiro, Feltovich, Jacobson, and 
Coulson (1992) ill-structured domains have two properties: a) each case in which knowledge 
has to be applied simultaneously and interactively involves multiple complex conceptual 
structures, and b) across comparable cases the conceptual structures involved and the way 
they interact differ. Van Merriënboer (1997) explains this in terms of the integration and 
coordination of two types of constituent skills tasks rely on. Tasks in complex cognitive 
domains are characterized by a large number of non-recurrent constituent skills (Van 
Merriënboer, 1997; Van Merriënboer & Kirschner, 2007). In contrast to recurrent constituent 
skills that rely on algorithmic, rule-based behavior (i.e., routine task aspects), non-recurrent 
constituent skills have to be performed in varying ways across problem situations. In other 
words, ill-structured tasks require a high degree of cognitive flexibility (Spiro et al., 1992). To 
acquire expertise in complex judgment tasks it is necessary to (a) understand the underlying 
theoretical principles of situations rather than relying on surface features (Chi, Feltovich, & 
Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980; Schmidt, Norman, & Boshuizen, 
1990), and (b) to monitor, critically reflect on, and adapt decision strategies to the irregularity 
of problem situations (Klein, 1998; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993). 
Deep understanding is known to be fostered by increasing the contextual interference 
between learning tasks (Battig, 1979; Magill & Hall, 1990). Contextual interference may be 
manipulated by the scheduling of learning tasks. Blocked task sequences, that is, sequences of 
learning tasks organised in blocks, with only one variation of a task being practised in each 
block (e.g., AAA-BBB-CCC), have low contextual interference. These have been found to 
lead to higher performance during training than random practice schedules (e.g., A-B-C-B-C-
A-A-C-B), which have high contextual interference (Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 1995). 
However, random practice schedules often result in better retention (learning) and transfer of 
skills to related tasks and situations (Greeno, 1964; Magill & Hall, 1990).  
The cognitive skills that are required for monitoring and critically reflecting on one’s 
own decision strategies may be acquired though critical thinking instruction. There are many 
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different types of critical thinking instruction (see e.g., Abrami et al, 2008, Tsui, 1999). The 
method developed by Cohen and Freeman (1998) focuses on acquiring the experience 
necessary to recognize a vast amount of situations and simultaneous development of cognitive 
strategies such as indentifying evidence-conclusion relationships, reflection on observations 
and assumptions, criticizing the assumptions and mental model, adapting the mental model 
and formulating alternatives. Important in this approach is teaching the learner to deal with 
uncertainty and conflict and to encourage the learner to consider alternative explanations of 
the situation, in other words, question his or her epistemological beliefs (Whitmire, 2004). 
Not only are cognitive strategies acquired through this approach, but it is also expected to 
enhance processes of generalization and abstraction of the content of the tasks, because it 
encompasses elements of reflection and self-explanation (see e.g., Boud, Keogh, & Walker, 
1985; Chi,1996).  
As a consequence, critical thinking processes may also increase interference during 
learning and as such support deep understanding of the learning materials. Therefore, both 
contextual interference and critical thinking may foster cognitive flexibility in complex 
judgment tasks. This should become evident in post-training performance, especially on far 
transfer tasks, that is, tasks that differ on both surface and structural features from the learning 
tasks (Quilici & Mayer, 1996), because such far transfer tasks do not call upon specific task 
procedures that were learnt, but instead require some abstract and general rules that can be 
adapted to new situations and tasks.  
An interesting question is whether these two techniques can also be combined and if 
so, how. Under conditions of low contextual interference (i.e., blocked sequence of learning 
tasks), concurrent critical thinking processes may serve to increase contextual interference 
and benefit learning. However, in conditions where there is already high contextual 
interference between learning tasks (i.e., random sequence), engaging in critical thinking 
processes concurrently may overload available cognitive resources and therefore critical 
thinking about previous learning tasks may be a better strategy.  
Thus, we arrive at the following propositions: 
1. Critical thinking instruction enhances post training performance 
on complex judgment tasks. 
2. Contextual interference enhances post training performance on 
complex judgment tasks. 
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3. For optimal learning benefit, in random practice critical thinking 
should be prompted retrospectively, whereas in blocked practice critical 
thinking should be prompted proactively. 
Below, we will further elaborate on these propositions and present empirical evidence 
from our studies.  
Critical Thinking Instruction Enhances Post Training Performance on Complex 
Judgment Tasks 
In many situations, people’s decisions are based on recognition of aspects of a 
situation, matching recognized aspects with earlier experiences, and forming a mental model 
of the current situation that implies a prototypical or sufficient decision option (Klein, Moon 
& Hoffman, 2006). Decisions in such a strategy are not made after all information is gathered, 
but rather are constructed along the way (Kuipers, Moskowitz & Kassirer, 1988), and 
therefore, early decisions may be based on simplified information and more relevant 
information for this decision may become available later in the process. Critically testing and 
evaluating one’s mental model are therefore considered paramount in the decision process, 
especially when high stakes are involved, when problems are dynamic and complex, or both. 
These critical thinking skills typically are not part of a training program for professional 
decision making; they are mainly acquired as a result of experience in the field (Anderson, 
1993; Klein, 1998; Klein et al., 1993). However, Freeman and Cohen (1996) developed an 
instructional strategy to teach these critical thinking skills.  
Critical thinking is conceptualized as higher order thinking that is purposeful, 
reasoned, and goal directed (Abrami et al., 2008) . It is involved in solving problems, 
formulating inferences, calculating likelihoods, and making decisions (Frijters, Ten Dam, & 
Rijlaarsdam, 2008; Halpern, 2003). Critical thinking training as it was developed by Freeman 
and Cohen (1997) on the basis of their recognition/metacognition theory aims to develop two 
types of skill: Recognition and (meta)cognitive strategies. Recognition is the mechanism that 
enables experienced decision makers to select all relevant cues from the situation to activate 
or form an accurate mental model of this situation. To develop the experience necessary to 
recognize a vast amount of situations, an individual needs to be confronted with many 
different situations and discover the relevant cues, rather than being told what aspects or cues 
are important in what situations (Stout et al., 1997). Training should therefore be focused on 
presenting as many relevant problem situations as possible, and each situation should 
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incorporate one or more relevant cues. From the breadth of experience that is provided in such 
training, the learner may generalize abstract representations that may guide judgment in novel 
situations (Morton & Munakata, 2002; Newell & Simon, 1972; Rougier, Noelle, Braver, 
Cohen & Reilly, 2005). 	  
To facilitate such a process of generalization of abstract representations, critical 
thinking instruction incorporates stepwise instruction in the cognitive strategies that guide the 
judgment processes and are expected to support elaboration and understanding of the problem 
situations. These cognitive strategies involve skills to indentify evidence-conclusion 
relationships, criticize the mental model, adapt the mental model, and perform so called quick 
tests. Quick tests investigate whether there is sufficient time and opportunity to continue with 
elaborative processing, or whether the current mental model should serve as the basis for an 
immediate decision (Freeman & Cohen, 1996). Thus, the training program for military 
officers that Freeman and Cohen developed not only involved the presentation of many 
different problem situations, but also contained four specific steps to instruct and prompt the 
elaborative processes: 
1. Develop a story (i.e., form a mental model) of the situation. 
Incorporate history, intentions and capacities of all parties involved in your 
story to explain all your observations and predict future events. 
2. Test your story for conflicting and/or missing information. Try 
to explain all observations within one comprehensive and coherent story, even 
if these observations do not seem to be related to your story. Identify gaps in 
your story and make explicit assumptions to cover these gaps. 
3. Evaluate your story. There is the devil’s advocate that tells 
you—part of—your story is false. Try to come up with an alternative story that 
can also explain your observations. Which story is more plausible? 
4. Develop plans and contingencies for the weakest assumptions in 
your story. 
Analyses of historic events may serve as training materials for story building. In such 
analyses, the decision processes of professionals involved are often documented, and as a 
consequence, all elements of a comprehensive story can be easily identified. During story 
building, testing, and evaluating, it is necessary to constantly monitor whether critical 
thinking is still useful and wise in the current situation, or whether immediate action is 
required. The three preconditions that call for continued critical thinking are: 
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1. The risk of delay is acceptable. 
2. The costs of a possible mistake are high. 
3. The situation is not routine, but new and/or complex. 
The critical thinking training by Freeman and Cohen (1996) starts with an initial 
instruction in the method, that is, an introduction to the theoretical background and the 
practical relevance of the approach, an explanation of the four critical thinking steps, and a 
demonstration of critical thinking being applied in a situation assessment and judgment 
problem. It continues with prompts being provided during practice to initiate the critical 
thinking processes in learners. The training has been empirically tested in several studies (e.g., 
Cohen, Freeman, & Thompson, 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996), but these studies were less 
than optimal. They were conducted in simplified training environments and compared the 
performance of participants who received critical thinking instruction with the performance of 
participants who did not receive any instruction at all. Furthermore, it was not established 
whether critical thinking had differential effects for transfer to tasks that differed on 
superficial features but shared the same underlying principles (near transfer) or tasks that 
differed on both superficial and underlying features (far transfer). Therefore, in two recent 
field studies (Helsdingen, Van den Bosch, Van Gog, & Van Merriënboer, 2009), we 
investigated the effects of critical thinking instruction on learning, near transfer, and far 
transfer. Participants received a military command and control training with six one-hour 
scenario-based exercises in both simplified and high fidelity learning environments. In both 
studies, half of the participants received instruction in critical thinking. The other half 
received the same exercises, but without critical thinking instruction. After the training, test 
scenarios were administered to both groups. Results provide support for the hypotheses that 
critical thinking instruction has a positive effect on transfer test performance and that this 
benefit is greater for far transfer performance than for near transfer performance. 
Cohen and colleagues (Cohen et al., 1998; Freeman & Cohen, 1996) attributed the 
benefits of critical thinking instruction to acquiring an appropriate judgment making strategy. 
When students are taught critical thinking skills, they are less likely to make the typical 
mistakes in making judgements, such as giving in to confirmation bias (i.e., interpret new 
information so that it complies with the things you already know) or neglect of probability 
(i.e., disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty; Halpern, 1997). Thus, 
they will show better overall performance on judgment tasks. In addition, the benefit 
especially for far transfer test performance that we found (Helsdingen et al,) suggests that 
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participants also gain a deeper, more abstract level of understanding of the task content that 
specifically enables them to solve decision problems different from the learning problems on 
both a superficial and structural level (i.e. non-recurrent skills). Hence, when instruction in 
expert cognitive strategies is combined with a broad set of practice scenario’s, the process of 
generalization of abstract representations is facilitated, leading to more cognitive flexibility 
and better transfer of judgment skill.	  
Contextual Interference Enhances Post Training Performance on Complex 
Judgment Tasks 
As stated before, contextual interference may also enhance generalization and 
abstraction processes (De Croock, van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998) and as a result, improve 
transfer across tasks or knowledge domains. Contextual interference may be increased by 
randomly scheduling learning tasks instead of a blocked presentation of these tasks. The 
effects of high contextual interference have been observed and studied extensively in the 
learning of motor tasks (Cross, Schmitt, & Grafton, 2007; Lee & Magill, 1983; Shea & 
Morgan, 1979; Simon, 2007), but are not unique to the motor learning domain. Studies on 
learning procedural tasks (Carlson, 1989; Carlson & Schneider, 1989; Carlson, Sullivan, & 
Schneider, 1989; Carlson & Yaure, 1990), cognitive operational tasks, such as interacting 
with automatic teller machines (Jamieson & Rogers, 2000), foreign vocabulary learning 
(Jacoby, 1978; Schneider, Healy, & Bourne, 1998, 2002), logical rules (Schneider, Healy, 
Ericsson, & Bourne, 1995), learning problem solving from worked examples (Paas & Van 
Merriënboer, 1994), or learning high-level cognitive tasks, such as troubleshooting a complex 
simulation of a chemical plant (De Croock et al., 1998), demonstrate that contextual 
interference is a general phenomenon that applies to a variety of learning tasks and contexts.  
Only few studies have been conducted in the past to investigate the effects of task 
interference on learning complex judgment, in which the goal is to learn the complex 
relationships between several phenomena and predict the value of a distal variable (e.g., 
clinical diagnosis, weather forecast, threat assessment; Brehmer, 1973, 1977, 1979). 
Moreover, these studies measured performance during training, not on retention or transfer 
tests. Since training principles that are effective with relatively simple tasks are not 
necessarily effective for complex tasks as well (Spiro & Jehng, 1990; Wulf & Shea, 2002;), 
research is required to establish whether contextual interference is effective for retention and 
transfer in learning this type of complex judgment task. It is important to establish the most 
optimal training sequence for such tasks, because of the far reaching consequences that for 
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example wrong clinical diagnoses or military judgments may have (Hogarth, 1980). Cognitive 
flexibility is paramount in such judgment problems: a physician for example, needs to learn to 
assess many different diseases and, equally important, needs to learn that different symptoms 
may lead to the same judgment since one patient may report one set of symptoms, whereas 
another patient having the same disease may report another set of symptoms. Therefore, a 
recent study by Helsdingen, Van Gog and Van Merriënboer (2009) explored the effects of 
contextual interference on learning and transfer of judgment skill to novel judgment problems.  
In this study, two experiments were conducted, investigating the effects of contextual 
interference on retention (exp 1) and transfer (exp 2). In Experiment 1, participants’ judgment 
accuracy on a retention test was higher after a random practice schedule (high contextual 
interference) than after a blocked or operational practice schedule. Experiment 2 
demonstrated that judgment on a transfer test was also better after a random practice schedule 
than after a blocked schedule. Both experiments failed to show any effects of contextual 
interference on performance during learning. These findings show that the benefits of 
contextual interference for retention and transfer, which have been reported in the literature 
for perceptual-motor tasks, also apply to learning complex judgment skill, and moreover, may 
be achieved without detrimental effects on performance during practice.  
For Optimal Learning Benefit, in Random Practice Critical Thinking Should Be 
Prompted Retrospectively, Whereas in Blocked Practice Critical Thinking Should Be 
Prompted Proactively 
As we argued before, the benefits of critical thinking instruction and a random practice 
schedule both seem to originate from learners developing a generalized, more abstract 
representation of the learning tasks. Critical thinking instruction as developed by Freeman and 
Cohen (1996) encompasses instructional measures such as reflection (Boud, Keogh, & 
Walker, 1985) and prompted self-explanations during learning (Chi, 1996; Renkl, 1997; 
Stark, Mandl, Gruber, & Renkl, 2002) that may enhance this process of generalization and 
abstraction. Similarly, different explanations for the positive effects of random practice (e.g., 
Lee & Magill, 1983; Shea & Morgan, 1979; Schmidt & Bjork, 1992) have in common that 
they assume that a random practice schedule calls for more elaborative processing between or 
within tasks, and that these elaborative processes lead to deeper understanding and, 
consequently, better retention and transfer test performance.  
However, such elaborate processing of the learning materials, both as a result of 
critical thinking instruction and contextual interference, requires working memory capacity of 
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the learner. And at the same time, the learning task, that is making predictive judgments on 
the basis of several cues, also places a high demand on working memory, because learners 
need to address multiple elements of information (cues) simultaneously and integrate that into 
a criterion. A limited working memory capacity could easily be overloaded if more than a few 
chunks of information are processed at the same time (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Miller, 1956). As 
Unsworth and Engle (2005) have shown, a reduced WM capacity, for example from a 
concurrent memory load, leads to a general decline in the ability to learn predictive 
relationships. But it is also known that organized, domain-specific, long-term memory 
knowledge structures (or schemas) allow people to overcome the limitations of working 
memory by “chunking” many elements of information into a single, higher-level element (see 
Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). And instructional 
measures such as critical thinking instruction and contextual interference are considered to 
support the development of these long-term memory schematic knowledge structures. Still, 
many researchers question the viability of teaching expert critical thinking skills to relative 
novices, claiming that novices in a particular domain may experience too high a workload 
from understanding the rules and principles of the domain and therefore do not have the 
cognitive resources available for (learning) higher order thinking skills (e.g., Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 1989;	  Winne, 1995). This high workload may be especially problematic, as 
research inspired by cognitive load theory (Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998; Van 
Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005) has shown that adding additional instructions under high 
workload conditions (i.e., in which learners have little if any cognitive resources available) 
may not just be ineffective but actually hamper learning in the domain (for a review see, e.g., 
Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003). 
It is therefore important to establish if and how we can combine critical thinking 
instruction and contextual interference to generate maximum benefit for learning and transfer. 
Helsdingen, Van Gog and Van Merriënboer (2009) studied effects of critical thinking 
instruction in different practice schedules. It was expected that a learner’s limited processing 
capacity would affect the success of combining the two measures. In conditions of high 
contextual interference, concurrently engaging a learning in critical thinking processes may be 
too demanding; whereas in conditions of low contextual interference, learners have the 
capacity to engage in critical thinking. Therefore, the timing of critical thinking prompts was 
manipulated: they could be given before the learning task they referred to, to encourage 
concurrent critical thinking; or they could be given after the learning task they referred to, 
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enabling reflection on these tasks. In line with our hypotheses, the results showed that in a 
blocked schedule, the pro-active prompts yielded better performance on the far transfer test 
than a blocked schedule without prompts or with retrospective prompts. Hence, the drawbacks 
of blocked practice for far transfer performance may be overcome by critical thinking 
instruction. In a random practice schedule, retrospective prompts led to better scores than 
proactive or no prompts, here, the learner’s processing capacity did not allow for concurrent 
critical thinking, but retrospective critical thinking improved deep understanding of the 
learning materials. This shows that both techniques can be successfully combined to stimulate 
transfer even further. 
Discussion 
Within the critical thinking research community, there is an ongoing debate on the 
issue of generalizability versus specificity of critical thinking skills (Siegel, 1991). Some 
studies have shown that special critical thinking programs usually do not result in long-lasting 
effects (Tsui, 1999). But at the same time, several authors point out that some general 
principles of critical thinking transcend specific subjects (e.g., Klaczynski, 2001; Stanovich & 
West, 2000; Tsui, 1999). As mentioned before, the transfer of skills across different tasks and 
knowledge domains is important because today’s jobs require professionals to work in 
continuously changing contexts. Transfer of knowledge and skills across domains is a 
prerequisite for the ability to perform adequately in different contexts, that is, for cognitive 
flexibility, especially when the context contains inconsistent, unexpected, incomplete, and 
imperfect events (Spiro & Jenhg, 1990).  
Still, the development of expertise in judgment and decision making skills is thought 
to be largely domain-specific (Ten Dam & Volman, 2002; Tsui, 1999). In their own domain, 
experienced decision makers quickly identify meaningful factors, realize what information 
they may be missing, recognize typical problems, and recall appropriate actions; in unfamiliar 
domains, the same decision makers may be at loss as to what the relevant factors are, thus 
making it impossible to realize missing information or come up with appropriate actions 
(Klein & Calderwood, 1991). Therefore, the challenge is to teach critical thinking in the 
context of specific meaningful subject matter, but yet in such a way that transfer to other tasks 
becomes possible (Brown, 1997; Frijters et al., 2008). Some researchers questioned the 
viability of such an approach, claiming that novices in a particular domain may experience too 
high a workload from understanding the rules and principles of the domain and therefore do 
not have the cognitive resources available for (learning) higher order thinking skills (e.g., 
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Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989;	  Winne, 1995). However, our studies have shown that genuine 
novices (i.e., they had no prior experience whatsoever with the learning task), were able to 
profit from the critical thinking instruction and reflection prompts while learning a complex 
judgment task, provided the prompts were appropriately timed in their particular practice 
schedule: Pro-active in a blocked schedule and retrospective in a random schedule. And when 
critical thinking prompts were not appropriately timed, participants’ performance indeed did 
not benefit from critical thinking instruction, possibly indicating they were not able to use the 
prompts due to high workload. But their performance was not negatively affected, which 
suggests that in high workload conditions learners may be able to ignore given prompts all 
together and focus on learning the specific rules and principles of the task without being 
distracted by them.  
 As stated earlier, instructional interventions that are successful in simple learning 
tasks do not always work for complex learning tasks (Wulf & Shea, 2002). Similarly, 
instructional interventions to increase cognitive flexibility and transfer may not be appropriate 
for different domains. The studies reported in this chapter considered complex judgment 
performance, in particular making predictive judgments based on integrating information 
from specific cues that occur in each case. However, in many judgments, nonoccurrence of a 
cue can be just as important as the occurrence of a cue (Mutter, Haggbloom, Plumlee & 
Schirmen, 2006). For example, in medical diagnosis, the absence of a symptom may provide 
as much diagnostic information as the presence of a symptom; in social attribution, the 
impression that someone does not like you may be based on the absence of overt words or 
actions that imply affection or interest. The study by Mutter et al. (2006) has shown that 
concurrent workload affect learning to utilize non-occurring cues differently than learning to 
utilize occurring cues. Therefore, the mediating effect of workload in the success of learning 
interventions may be different for different domains or learning tasks and future research 
could establish what task aspects interact with workload and instructional interventions on 
learning and transfer performance.  
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